

STAFF NOTES:

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks will resume in Geneva on Friday to hammer out the details of the understandings reached at Vladivostok. In the wake of the recent US-Soviet trade setback, progress will be watched closely around the world as a measure of Moscow's continuing commitment to detente. The Soviets, well aware of this linkage, are publicly touting the importance of cooperation on arms control by the super powers. Nevertheless, in view of the present somewhat strained state of detente, the Soviets are likely to be cool, but correct, in Geneva and rigidly legalistic in pursuing an agreement.

The November summit set ten-year ceilings on the number of strategic delivery vehicles permitted each side (2,400) and on the portion of the missile force equipped with multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (1,320). These limits will form the backbone of a treaty that could be ready for signing at the US-Soviet summit later this year. For that schedule to be met, the SALT negotiators must agree on a number of difficult issues, including:

- --Which weapons systems will count toward the totals, and which will be excluded from limitation under the treaty.
- --What mutual restrictions and interpretations will be necessary to ensure verifiability of compliance with the terms of the treaty.

There is ample opportunity and precedent for serious, even insurmountable, differences on each of these items should the Soviets have second thoughts about their policy toward the US.

Thus far, despite the collapse of the 1972 trade agreement and serious differences with the US on the Middle East, there is no evidence that Moscow has qualms about the Vladivostok accords. On the contrary, the Soviets have recently reemphasized their initial, strongly positive public assessments, apparently to offset the negative effect on detente of US-Soviet friction elsewhere.

Moscow has particularly stressed the significance of US recognition of Soviet strategic parity, occasionally reassuring domestic skeptics that the Vladivostok agreements will not lead to unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet media have asserted that any follow-on negotiations on reductions of strategic arms would have to take into account the existence of other nuclear powers. There have been no signs, however, that Moscow intends to reintroduce at this session the issues of third-country nuclear powers, US forward-based systems, or so-called "geographic factors" which it decided not to press at the No-vember summit.

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East Germany-West Germany: Who Is a Citizen of What?

Conflicting East and West German views of German citizenship have led Pankow to lodge a formal protest against alleged "West German interference" in East German efforts to establish consular relations with third countries.

The controversy was triggered by Austrian willingness, over West German objections, to recognize separate East German citizenship in an impending consular convention.

For Bonn, the citizenship issue is closely tied to its hopes for eventual reunification—hopes that Pankow would like to quash. Bonn recognizes the GDR, but denies the existence of separate East German citizenship on the grounds that there are two German states within one German nation.

The problem could be politically explosive in West Germany. Bonn and Pankow agree to disagree on citizenship and a host of similar "judicial" issues. Now, however, Pankow threatens to outflank Bonn by forcing its conventional view of citizenship on neutral and Western countries, including the US, the UK, and France, which will be negotiating consular agreements.

Although Vienna has rejected Bonn's criticism and has pointed out the illogic of recognizing a state without recognizing its citizens, it has also indicated that the convention would not deter the West German embassy from representing anyone who says he is a West German citizen. French officials have showed a willingness to exchange memoranda with Bonn in which the French would guarantee West

German consular officers access to any "German" who desired to see them, but they have also warned that the East German consul would have to be notified in cases involving East German citizens.

The Fast Germans may take comfort from the statement of Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen, who says the consular agreement that his country is negotiating with Pankow is an exclusively bilateral concern. Karjalainen firmly stated that he has no intention of discussing the issue with West German Foreign Minister Genscher, who was expected in Helsinki shortly.

The failure of third countries to support Bonn's position could provide the Christian Democratic opposition a significant new cudgel with which to belabor the Schmidt government. Several West German state elections loom this year. Schmidt could also find it politically impossible to begin the long-awaited talks with East Germany on a range of practical improvements in relations.

A resolution of West German - Austrian differences on citizenship at this point apparently would be difficult. The press and public opinion in both countries have been sensitized to the problem, and Kreisky has committed himself publicly to the Austrian position. Bonn is toying with the idea of exchanging private letters with Vienna acknowledging Bonn's position.

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CHRONOLOGY

	January	21	Tass reports today's pledge by President Ford that the policy of detente with the USSR would be "continued, widened, and deepened."	25X1
			Pravda article pegged to the 51st anniversary of Lenin's death hails collective leadership as the CPSU's great strength.	25X1
•			State Department informs the US embassy in Prague that it has decided to postpone the opening of the US consulate at Bratislava until FY 1976.	25X1
			Soviet Ambassador to Laos Vdovin informs the US that the USSR has agreed to undertake several minor construction projects in the Pathet Lao zone.	25X1
25X1			Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski begins an overnight, official visit to the USSR.	_
		,	Politburo member Shelepin confers with exiled Chilean labor leader Figueroa in Moscow.	25X1
			Deputy Premier I. Novikov arrives in North Korea for talks on bilateral economic relations.	25X1
			Mongolian party delegation leaves Moscow for home after meeting with CPSU secretary Katushev.	25X1

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January	23	Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Sushkov arrives in Japan for final-stage negotiations on bilateral development of the natural gas deposits off Sakhalin Island.	25X1 25X1
		Cuban Deputy Premier Castilla concludes his official visit to the USSR; today he met with Deputy Premier Kirillin and Politburo candidate-member Demichev.	
		CEMA Executive Committee concludes a three-day meeting in Moscow, its 70th session.	25X1
		Czechoslovak party chief Husak concludes a four-day, official visit to Bulgaria.	25X1
		Indian Foreign Minister Chavan completes a five-day, official visit to Yugoslavia.	25X1
		Lebanese President Franjiyah confers with Soviet Ambassador Soldatov, who allegedly conveys a USSR offer to	

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		supply Lebanon with three missile networks. GDR formally protests to the FRG over latter's alleged efforts to interfere in East German relations with third countries.	25X1 25X1
25X1	January 24	Polish party secretary Felek completes a two-day, official visit to Moscow for talks on "current international problems" and bilateral party cooperation.	
			25X1
		Politburo member Kirilenko and party secretary Katushev confer with visiting Cuban Deputy Premier Rodriguez.	25X1
	January 25	Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi confers with Soviet Ambassador Polyakov in Cairo; Fahmi subsequently announces that Foreign Minister Gromyko will arrive in Egypt on February 3 for a	
		USSR and Cuba sign a five-year technological cooperation agreement in Moscow.	25X1 25X1
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Politburo member Shelepin arrives in East Germany for an extraordinary session of the World Federation of Trade Unions.

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	Approved For Rel	ease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070019-2	25X1
		East German Politburo member Axen and Foreign Minister Fischer, on an official visit to the USSR, are received by Gromyko.	
		Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek begins a five-day, official visit to Finland.	25X1
		Albania's legislature, the People's Assembly, convenes.	25X1
		Soviet MBFR negotiator Khlestov goes to Vienna for resumption of the East-West talks.	25X1
	January 28	SALT's standing consultative commission convenes.	25X1
		FUTURE EVENTS	
	January 29	Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers expected to convene in Moscow.	25X1
	January 30	Soviet economic delegation to arrive in Pakistan.	25X1
25X1	January 31	Politburo member Shelepin to commence an official visit to West Germany.	
		SALT to resume in Geneva.	25X1
25X1	Late January	Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov to make an official visit to Yugoslavia.	
		Czechoslovak Premier Strougal to make an official visit to Romania.] 25X1

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Ear F	ly ebruar	У	US and USSR likely to resume in Moscow their talks on handling peaceful nuclear explosion devices in a threshold test ban treaty.	25X1
			Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen to make an official visit to the USSR.	
			Icelandic Foreign Minister Agustsson to make an official visit to the USSR; he has an appointment with Foreign Minister Gromyko on February 5.] 25X1
Feb	ruary	4	Representatives of the EC Commission to begin three days of talks in Moscow with CEMA officials.	25X1
Feb	ruary	7	New Zealand Prime Minister Rowling to depart on an extended trip that will include visits to Romania and Yugoslavia.	25X1
			UN Secretary General Waldheim to commence a three-day, official visit to East Germany.	25X1
				25X1
Feb	ruary	12	Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Parsky to commence a five-day, official visit to the USSR.	25X1
Feb	oruary	13	UK Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan to begin a six-day, official visit to the USSR.	25X1

	Approved For Rele	ease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070019-2	
			25X1
	Mid-February	Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski to make official visit to Hungary.	
25X1	Fobruary 24	US and USSR to resume in Washington their talks on an agreement to curb efforts to modify the environment to gain military advantages.	25X1
	Late	French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues	
	February	expected to make an official visit to Poland.	25X1
			25X1
	Early March	French parliamentary delegation led by former Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to visit the USSR.	25X1
	March 4	Twenty-six nation Geneva disarmament conference, co-chaired by the US and the USSR, expected to convene.	25X1
	March 11	Romanian chief of staff Coman to begin a nine-day, official visit to the US, the first by such a high-ranking officer from a Warsaw Pact member-state.	25X1
	March	Former West German Chancellor Brandt likely to visit the USSR.	 25X1
	Late March	French Prime Minister Chirac to make an official visit to the USSR.	25X1
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